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Abstract To deal with potential conflicts between the
triple-bottom-line expectations of investors and the per-
formance of executives, firms can use incentives by inte-
grating corporate social performance (CSP) targets into
executive compensation. No evidence yet exists that CSP
targets in executive compensation actually lead to an
improvement of CSP results. Using a panel data set of 400
firms for the years 2008–2012 leading to 1846 firm-year
observations, the relationships between CSP targets and
CSP results and CSP improvements are analyzed. The
results show that (a) the level of CSP has no effect on the
use of CSP targets, (b) the use of CSP targets in general
does not automatically lead to better CSP results, and
(c) the use of quantitative, hard CSP targets is an effective
way to improve CSP results, especially to lower CSP
weaknesses.
Keywords CSP  Executive remuneration  Sustainable
targets
Introduction
Although every firm needs to perform financially, firms are
increasingly expected to behave in socially responsible
ways and consider the interests of stakeholders such as
communities, employees, and environmental groups. This
trend is caused by changing regulations but also by
emerging investor activism (Goranova and Ryan 2014;
Parker 2014). Investor activism has an effect on broader
corporate outcomes and stakeholder issues, such as the
firm’s environmental impact (Lee and Lounsbury 2011;
Reid and Toffel 2009) and its corporate social performance
(CSP) (David et al. 2007; Rehbein et al. 2004). Investors
may raise both financial as well as social issues (O’Rourke
2003), reflecting their concern for the triple bottom line of
economic, social, and environmental performance (Crifo
and Forget 2013; Goranova and Ryan 2014).
In response to these pressures, an increasing number of
firms seek to improve their CSP. One approach firms have
taken is to put CSP on the agenda of the executive by
introducing CSP indicators in the executive evaluation and
reward process (Coombs and Gilley 2005). The recently
published guidelines on integrating environmental, social,
and governance (ESG) issues in executive pay by the
United Nations provide a tangible tool to guide dialog on
this issue and to help firms improve corporate boards’
practices (PRI 2012). Despite the importance of target
setting for firms, research offers little empirical evidence
regarding their use and performance effects (Arnold and
Artz 2015). Practitioners (Tonello 2011) as well as
researchers (Kolk and Perego 2014) debate the effective-
ness of CSP incentives to improve CSP results.
Since the 1980s, agency theorists have begun to inves-
tigate the relationship between pay and managerial actions
(Coughlan and Schmidt 1985; Larcker 1983). Although a
limited number of studies have addressed the idea of
‘strategic’ reward systems, matching compensation sys-
tems to a firms’ strategy (Artz et al. 2012; Boyd and Sal-
amin 2001), there is some recent evidence that CEOs
respond to compensation schemes in the manner intended
(Chng et al. 2012; O’Connell and O’Sullivan 2014; Pathak
et al. 2014). Unfortunately, this evidence is mainly
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available for financial targets. In contrast, we know very
little about the effectiveness of CSP targets. The available
research provides only scarce insight into the use of CSP
targets in executive compensation (e.g., Berrone and
Gomez-Mejia 2009a; Cordeiro and Sarkis 2008), and
informs us even less about the effects of these CSP targets
on CSP results (Russo and Harrison 2005).
This study adds to existing knowledge, first, by using a
large, longitudinal sample of S&P 500 firms to identify the
use of CSP targets, specified toward qualitative, soft CSP
targets and quantitative, hard CSP targets; second, by
analyzing whether CSP is a predictor for the use of CSP
targets or a consequence of the use of CSP targets; third, by
analyzing if the use of CSP targets has an effect on CSP
results.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The
next section provides the theoretical background and
introduces the hypotheses. An introduction to CSP, exec-
utive compensation, and an overview of existing studies
investigating the relationships between these topics is
provided in this second section. The third section describes
the method used, data, and statistics. Results are described
in the fourth section, and finally discussion and conclusions
are provided in the fifth section.
Theoretical Background and Hypotheses
Corporate Social Performance
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) and CSP have been
present in accounting and management literature for about
45 years. The CSR and CSP concepts have been defined in
many different ways (see for an overview of definitions
Dahlsrud 2008), but generally imply that firms are
accountable to a wide audience of stakeholders such as
employees, customers, and local communities. Where CSR
focuses on the behavior or strategy of a firm, CSP is the
result or the outcome of this behavior (Wood 2010).
Increased demand for CSP is, among others, observable
through attention from investors for topics such as climate
change and ethical issues (David et al. 2007) aiming to
identify the long-term investment opportunities and risks
for firms (Herremans et al. 1993; Luo et al. 2014; Tan,
2014). The results of such developments have led to the
creation of new accounting, control, and reporting systems
to respond to CSR-related information both internally and
externally (Bebbington and Larrinaga 2014; Gray 2010;
Henri and Journeault 2010) and to the creation of various
sustainability indices. Some examples are the Dow Jones
Sustainability Index (DJSI) and databases providing
information on CSP and ESG issues, such as the infor-
mation provided by Thomson Reuters ASSET4,
Bloomberg, and the MSCI ESG STATS, formerly known
as the Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini (KLD) database.
Executive Compensation
When capital suppliers of a firm become more interested in
CSP, they want to make sure that the firms’ executives are
focused on the firms’ CSP as well. The potential conflict of
interest between principals—the suppliers of capital to the
firm—and the agents—the managers of the firm delegated
with the decision-making responsibilities—is the essence
of agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1979). In the many
decades of scholarly research into directors’ compensation,
agency theory is the most commonly used theoretical
perspective (for good overviews see Gerhart et al. 2009;
Larkin et al. 2012). Providing managers with financial
incentives in the form of a compensation contract is a
widely used approach to align the interests of the principals
and the agents (Bonner and Sprinkle 2002; Deckop et al.
2006; Makri et al. 2006). Although there is substantial
heterogeneity in pay practices across firms, industries, and
countries (e.g., Jansen et al. 2009), most executive pay
packages contain four basic components: a base salary, an
annual bonus tied to accounting performance, stock
options, and long-term incentive plans (Murphy 1999).
Research suggests that it is essential to distinguish between
different uses of performance measurement and their
determinants (Van Veen-Dirks 2010). It is often questioned
whether compensation plans contain sufficient incentives
to take optimal actions on behalf of the principals (Jensen
and Murphy 1990) and other stakeholders (Faulkender
et al. 2010).
CSP and Executive Compensation
Traditionally, incentives only addressed the financial per-
formance of the firm (Berrone and Gomez-Mejia 2009b).
More recently, firms started to use CSP targets in incentive
systems (Berrone and Gomez-Mejia 2009a; PRI 2012;
Russo and Harrison 2005). This study is not the first
research analyzing the interrelationships of executive
compensation, CSP targets, and a firms’ CSP. Most of the
existing studies focus on the effect of executive compen-
sation on CSP (see Fig. 1, intermitted line), and a few
studies analyze whether this effect changes when CSP
targets are used (see Fig. 1, dotted line), while only one
empirical study was found to actually analyze the effect of
CSP targets on CSP (see Fig. 1, full line).
The existing studies show mixed results about the effect
of executive compensation on CSP. A negative relationship
has been found to exist between executive salaries and
firms’ environmental reputation (Coombs and Gilley
2005), executive salaries and CSP (Cai et al. 2011;
K. Maas
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Stanwick and Stanwick 2001), and short-term bonuses and
CSP (Deckop et al. 2006). Some studies provide more
detail and analyze the disaggregated effects on CSP
strengths and CSP weaknesses. CSP strengths capture the
extent to which a firm can be deemed socially responsible,
while CSP weaknesses capture violations of social
responsibility, such as pollution, corruption, or fraud. A
positive relationship has been found to exist between
executive salaries and CSP (Callan and Thomas 2011),
long-term incentives and CSP (Deckop et al. 2006), exec-
utive salaries and CSP weaknesses (Mahoney and Thorne
2005, 2006; McGuire et al. 2003), and bonuses, stock
options, and CSP strengths (Mahoney and Thorne 2005,
2006).
In contrast to the previous studies, only looking at the
effect of executive compensation on CSP, some studies aim
to assess how the use of CSP targets moderates the effect of
executive remuneration on CSP. Cordeiro and Sarkis
(2008) focus on environmental performance and study how
explicit links between CSP and executive compensation
function. They conclude that executives are rewarded for
CSP only in firms that explicitly link CSP targets to
executive compensation, while firms that do not use CSP
targets do not explicitly and directly reward executives for
CSP. Although this conclusion might seem straightforward,
it could also be interpreted in an alternative way. If CSP
would lead to higher financial performance, as has been
shown by many authors (e.g., Margolis and Walsh 2003;
Margolis et al. 2007; Eccles et al. 2011), executives might
still be indirectly rewarded for higher CSP. Next to that,
CSP might also lead to improved reputation of a firm and
its executive (e.g., Eccles et al. 2011) and might be seen as
a non-financial incentive (Staw and Epstein 2000; Zajac
1998). Contrary to this, Berrone and Gomez-Mejia (2009a)
conclude that firms with an explicit environmental pay
policy do not reward CSP more than firms who do not have
those mechanisms. In result, they theorize that these
mechanisms are symbolic rather than instrumental: ‘‘firms
that are unwilling to make the necessary investment to
reduce or eliminate toxic emissions may instead adopt
structures like explicit environmental pay policies to signal
concern about the natural environment and appear to be
taking the right steps to preserve it’’ (Berrone and Gomez-
Mejia 2009a, p. 120).
Two descriptive studies (Eccles et al. 2011; Kolk and
Perego 2014) provide information on the use of CSP tar-
gets in executive compensation, but these studies do not
give any information on the effects of the use of CSP
targets in executive compensation on a firms’ CSP. Eccles
et al. (2011) described that mainly firms that have better
CSP use CSP incentives. They did not, however, examine
whether incentives actually contribute to a higher CSP.
Kolk and Perego (2014) describe four case studies from the
Netherlands, and conclude that it is not clear whether
including CSP targets in executive remuneration is a sign
of firms taking their social responsibility seriously or just a
form of window dressing and/or yet another perverse
mechanism that allows firms to keep bonus levels high
Executive compensation Corporate Social Performance (CSP) 
Targets for CSP 
Russo and Harrison 2005
Cordeiro and Sarkis 2008
Berrone and Gomez-Mejia 2009 
Eccles et al. 2011 
Kolk and Perego 2014 
Stanwick and Stanwick 2001
McGuire et al. 2003 
Cooms and Gilley 2005 
Mahoney and Thorne 2005 
Mahoney and Thorne 2006 
Deckop et al. 2006  
Cai et al. 2011 
Callan and Thomas 2011
Fig. 1 Literature overview of executive compensation, CSP, and targets for CSP
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(Kolk and Perego 2014). Interestingly, although all these
studies analyze the use of CSP targets in executive com-
pensation, none of them analyze the effect that the inte-
gration of these targets has on CSP.
Only one empirical study was found to actually assess
the influence of CSP targets on CSP results (Russo and
Harrison 2005). This study by Russo and Harrison (2005) is
industry specific and only studies environmental perfor-
mance. It looks at the environmental performance of firms
in the electronics industry, and concludes that there is weak
evidence that environmental targets can elicit desired
environmental performance on the plant level. ‘‘Environ-
mental targets could represent a new ‘‘carrot’’ and shift
some managerial attention to environmental issues’’ (Russo
and Harrison 2005, p. 590). They also conclude that
facilities in their sample seem to behave mainly reactively
and in result remuneration policies seem to follow from
emissions and not the other way around.
CSP as a Predictor or a Consequence of the Use
of CSP Targets?
Previous research has failed to provide a clear picture on
the causal relation between CSP and CSP targets. In result,
it is not clear at all whether firms that have weaker CSP are
more likely to introduce CSP targets. Introducing CSP
targets in executive compensation as a consequence of a
high level of CSP results might be seen as a form of
window dressing (Berrone and Gomez-Mejia 2009a; Kolk
and Perego 2014). Although one could also offer an
alternative explanation, as firms with high levels of CSP
results might introduce CSP targets in executive compen-
sation to formalize the institutionalization of their com-
mitment to CSP. Taking an agency theory approach to the
use of targets, one would expect that especially firms with
weaker CSP results are likely to introduce CSP targets in
the compensation of their executives; as these firms are
more likely to be interested in using these targets as a
managerial instrument to align the incentives of its man-
agers with the firms’ goals. As a result, it is expected that
firms with a low level of CSP results will make more use of
CSP targets than firms with a high level of CSP results.
H1 Firms with a low level of CSP results will be more
likely to use CSP targets in executive compensation.
If the results would show that indeed firms with weaker
CSP use CSP targets more often in their executive com-
pensation, it would still not be clear whether the use of CSP
targets actually leads to higher CSP results. The single
study that analyzed the effectiveness of CSP targets found
environmental targets to lead to higher environmental
performance in the electronics industry (Russo and
Harrison 2005). Here, it is similarly expected that CSP
targets lead to higher CSP results.
H2 Companies that use CSP targets in executive com-
pensation have higher CSP results.
Quantitative, Hard CSP Targets Versus Qualitative,
Soft CSP Targets
Researchers as well as practitioners have argued that it is
important to distinguish quantitative, hard CSP targets and
qualitative, soft CSP targets. In 2010, the European Sus-
tainable Investment Forum stated: ‘‘concerns exist around
the extent to which performance targets are set as ‘soft
targets’ thereby guaranteeing a minimum level of bonus’’
(Eurosif 2010, p. 4). A ‘soft target’ is a target without
clear-cut underlying quantification, e.g., reduction of CO2
emissions in the next year, increasing the amount of
women at the top in the next year or improving the rating
of the firm at the DJSI in the next year. In contrast to this, a
‘hard target’ is a target with clear-cut underlying quantifi-
cation, e.g., reduction of CO2 emissions with 20 percent in
the next year, increasing the amount of women at the top
from 10 percent to 25 percent by 2020 or improving the
rating of the firm at the DJSI from the fifth position to the
fourth position in the next year. According to the organi-
zational psychology literature and the accounting literature,
soft targets are often less accurate and reliable than hard
targets because they are less controllable, less objective
and often influenced by the rater’s biases (Feldman 1981).
On one hand, subjectivity can be useful in mitigating
various problems faced in assigning rewards through for-
mulas based on quantitative performance measures (Gibbs
et al. 2004). On the other hand, subjectivity in compensa-
tion systems can lower managers’ motivation to perform on
the specific target, while they will be less able to distin-
guish what constitutes good performance (Ittner et al.
2003). In this study, it is expected that quantitative, hard
CSP targets are more effective in improving CSP results
than qualitative, soft CSP targets.
H3 The use of quantitative, hard CSP targets in executive
compensation leads to greater improvement in CSP results
as compared to the use of qualitative, soft CSP targets.
Method
Sample
Our initial sample consists of S&P 500 listed firms for the
years 2008–2012 tracked by MSCI ESG STATS (the for-
merly the KLD database). MSCI ESG STATS is an inde-
pendent agency with a long history of tracking firms, and
K. Maas
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rating firms, on the basis of a number of CSP dimensions
(Barnett and Salomon 2012). The MSCI ESG STATS
database is the largest multidimensional CSP database
available to the public (Deckop et al. 2006) and has been
used frequently in recent academic research (e.g., Barnett
and Salomon 2012; Cheng et al. 2014; Coombs and Gilley
2005). We use firm-level operational data from COMPU-
STAT, an international database of fundamental and mar-
ket data on firms. Annual proxy statements are used to
collect information on performance measures and specify
whether firms have targets for CSP linked to executive
compensation. This leads to a sample of 400 firms, and for
the remaining 100 firms annual proxy statements are not
available for all years. To control for within-firm dynamics,
a one-year time lag of the dependent variable is used in our
empirical specification. This reduced our observations to a
maximum amount of 1846 observations.
Measures
Corporate Social Performance
Following Deckop et al. (2006), the proxy for CSP in this
study is constructed on the basis of the summated scores of
six MSCI ESG STATS categories: Employee Relations,
Product Quality, Community Relations, Natural Environ-
ment, Human Rights, and Diversity. MSCI ESG STATS
uses data from a variety of company, government, non-
government organization, and media sources to rate firms
based on social performance criteria. The scores are
obtained by differencing the scores on the strength and
weakness dimension of each category. We use the disag-
gregated scores for weaknesses and strengths in addition to
the aggregated total scores as proxy for CSP. To calculate
the total CSP score for each particular category, its total
CSP weakness score is subtracted from its total CSP
strength score (Barnett 2007). The change in the level of
CSP over a given period is defined as the difference
between the MSCI ESG STATS scores between two peri-
ods over the whole period 2008–2012.
Corporate Social Performance Targets
Data on CSP targets in executive compensation are col-
lected from annual proxy statements (form DEF 14A) filed
in the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval
(EDGAR) system from the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). Proxy statements are the only publicly
available source, which officially provide information on
executive performance measures (Macindoe and Eaton
2011). The mandatory section ‘‘Compensation Discussion
and Analysis’’ has been the primary area of proxy state-
ments to collect data. In addition, search keywords in line
with MSCI ESG STATS category items are used to assure
that no targets are accidentally overlooked. Table 1 shows
the used target coding, which is in line with the MSCI ESG
STATS categories. A distinction between the use of qual-
itative, soft CSP targets and quantitative, hard CSP targets
is made. Each target used is labeled as a quantitative, hard
target if clear-cut underlying quantification is provided (a
target percentage, amount, or other quantifiable metric), or
as a qualitative, soft target if no clear-cut underlying
quantification is provided.
Firm Controls
Several variables are included in the hypothesis-testing
model to control for the firm-specific situation: the exis-
tence of a CSP committee, firms’ size, and financial per-
formance. There are two main approaches to mitigate
agency conflicts, implementation of incentives and moni-
toring. The introduction of CSP targets in the executive
compensation structure is one example of the first
approach. The second approach focuses not on rewarding
but on monitoring, for example by installing a board
commission (Tosi et al. 1997). More and more executive
boards create committees on CSP (Mackenzie 2007). CSP
committees, defined as a board committee responsible for
any of the target categories of CSP, may be asked to pro-
vide advice and recommendations to the executive board
about stakeholder issues and trends, as well as company
goals and strategies to achieve them (White 2006). CSP
committees may, for example, advice on metrics, internal
policies, and/or practices affecting CSP objectives (Cramer
and Hirschland 2006). Existence of a CSP committee is
expected to have an effect on the use of CSP targets as well
as on CSP results and has been identified based on the
proxy statements (1 = yes, 0 = no).
Firm size is assessed as the logarithm of total assets.
Based on past research (e.g., Artiach et al. 2010), and we
expect firm size to be associated with the use of CSP tar-
gets and CSP results. Financial performance is, similar to
previous studies (Deckop et al. 2006; McGuire et al. 2003),
measured as return on assets (ROA) and expected to have
an effect on the use of CSP targets and CSP results. Data
on total asset and ROA are collected from COMPUSTAT.
Statistical Methodology
We use an ordinary least squares (OLS) specification for
both models. Previous research has identified many
macroeconomic factors associated with CSP, including
changes in governmental policy and systemic, macroeco-
nomic shocks (Barnett and Salomon 2012). Therefore year
effects are added to the models. Next to that, we incorpo-
rate a one-year lag of the independent variable into every
Do Corporate Social Performance Targets in Executive Compensation Contribute to Corporate…
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specification to account for within-firm persistence in
performance and for the possibility that some effects will
manifest only in the next year. To correct for unobserved
between-firm heterogeneity, we incorporate firm fixed
effects into the models’ specification. Given the panel
structure of the data with multiple observations per firm,
Table 1 CSP target coding and search keywords
Identified targets* Category
Ethics CSP targets-yes, categories-unknown
Corporate citizenship CSP targets-yes, categories-unknown
Social responsibility CSP targets-yes, categories-unknown
Inclusion/diversity Diversity
Inclusion of females and minorities Diversity
Tolerance and inclusion in the workplace Diversity
Employee engagement Employee relations
People development Employee relations
Employee relations Employee relations
Societal objectives Employee relations
Teamwork Employee relations
Development/retention/recruitment of employees Employee relations
Development/management of talent Employee relations
Measures for work environment (employee satisfaction survey) Employee relations
Employee satisfaction Employee relations
Human capital objectives/needs Employee relations
Employee turnover Employee relations
Health Employee relations
Effort to improve health of the employees Employee relations
Safety Employee relations
Total recordable incident rate Employee relations
Health, safety, and environment (HSE) Split into employee relations and environment
Environmental objectives Environment
Environment protection Environment
Environmental sustainability Environment
Environmental stewardship Environment
Climate change prevention Environment
Waste reduction Environment
Significant environmental violations Environment
Improving energy efficiency Environment
Quality of work product Product quality
Product innovation Product quality
Enterprise quality Product quality
Foster quality in the company Product quality
Community engagement/involvement Community/stakeholder engagement
Stakeholder engagement Community/stakeholder engagement
Stakeholders Community/stakeholder engagement
Supporting volunteer efforts in the communities in which we work Community/stakeholder engagement
Meeting social responsibility to communities Community/stakeholder engagement
Establishing/maintaining strong relationships with stakeholders Community/stakeholder engagement
Active lifestyle initiatives Unknown
Search keywords Safety, Health, Environment, Employee, People, Engagement, Community, Stakeholder, Diversity, Quality, Philanthropy,
Public, Social, Responsibility, Talent, Human, Rights, Non-financial, Ethics, Sustainability
* Some targets can be related to different categories. For example, a company with a target for Corporate Citizenship is classified as having a
target for CSP, but as it is unknown how the company interprets this target, it is classified as ‘‘unknown’’
K. Maas
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the possibility arises that the errors (eit) will be correlated
within firms across time. Such serial correlation of resid-
uals across multiple observations within firms could lead
to invalid regression results. We therefore incorporate
linear autoregressive dynamics with lags of the dependent
variable as regressors to account for within-firm persis-
tence in performance (see Greene 2003).
Model 1 H1ð Þ : CSPtargetsit
¼ b0 þ b1CSPtargetsit1 þ b2Xit1
þ b3Yeart þ b4Firmi þ eit
Model 2 H2ð Þ : CSPit
¼ b0 þ b1CSPit1 þ b2Xit1 þ b3Yeart
þ b4Firmi þ eit
Model 3 H3ð Þ : DCSPit
¼ b0 þ b1DCSPit1 þ b2Xit1 þ b3Yeart
þ b4Firmi þ eit
In summary, we control for dynamic firm-level charac-
teristics as well as within-firm AR(1) dynamics, fixed year
effects, and fixed firm effects to estimate the effect of CSP
targets on CSP results.
Results
The correlations for the variables and descriptive statistics
are provided, respectively, in Tables 2 and 3. To check for
multicollinearity, tolerance and variance inflation indices
are calculated. All values were far below 10, which is the
general threshold for concern (Kennedy 2003).
Over the years, between 32 percent in 2008 and 40 per-
cent in 2012 of the firms use CSP targets in executive
compensation (see Table 3). This number is higher than the
29 percent found by Macindoe and Eaton (2011), and
approximately the same as the 38 percent reported by
Tonello (2011) and the 40 percent reported byGraafland and
Zhang (2014). Most popular are the use of CSP targets for
employee relations and diversity. The least used are CSP
targets for human rights issues, product quality and com-
munity, and stakeholder engagement. The number of firms
that use quantitative, hard targets is much lower than those
using qualitative soft targets, and ranges over the years from
4 percent in 2008 up to 8 percent in 2012. Quantitative, hard
targets are mainly used for employee relations (e.g., targets
related to safety issues like the reduction of accidents in the
next year from 10 to 8), diversity (e.g., increase of the
number of women in top position from 5 percent to 10 per-
cent in the next year), and environmental issues (e.g.,
reduction ofCO2 emissionswith 10 percent in the next year).
Results of the OLS regression are reported in Tables 4,
5, and 6. The first hypothesis predicts a negative rela- T
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tionship between the level of CSP and the use of CSP
targets in executive compensation. The results in Table 4
show that the aggregated as well as the disaggregated
levels of CSP have no significant effect on the use of CSP
targets in executive compensation. In result H1 is rejected.
The second hypothesis predicts a positive effect of the
use of CSP targets in executive remuneration on CSP
results. The results in Table 5 show significant effects on
an aggregated level only for firms using quantitative, hard
targets (0.11, P\ 0.05). On a disaggregated level, the
results show that only firms using quantitative, hard targets
have significantly less CSP weaknesses (-0.05, P\ 0.10).
In result H2 is partly accepted.
Hypothesis three predicts that the improvement in CSP
will be higher for firms using quantitative, hard CSP targets
in executive remuneration as compared to the use of
qualitative, soft CSP targets. On an aggregated CSP level,
indeed Table 6 shows a significant result for quantitative,
hard targets (0.17, P\ 0.05). In case a firm uses qualita-
tive, soft targets, a negative significant result is found
(-0.06, P\ 0.10). On a disaggregated level, a significant
result is found for CSP weaknesses showing that firms
Table 3 Identified CSP targets (2008–2012)
CSP
targets
Diversity Employee
relations
Environment Human
rights
Product
quality
Community/
stakeholder
engagement
2008 (N = 400)
Targets 126 44 53 32 0 16 12
Hard targets 14 5 25 9 0 4 0
No targets 249 323 313 334 365 350 355
Unknown 25 33 34 34 35 34 33
% Targets 32 % 11 % 13 % 8 % 0 % 4 % 3 %
% Hard targets 4 % 1 % 6 % 2 % 0 % 1 % 0 %
2009 (N = 400)
Targets 142 45 68 37 2 35 25
Hard targets 29 5 24 6 0 1 1
No targets 235 322 298 330 364 333 343
Unknown 23 33 34 33 34 32 32
% Targets 36 % 11 % 17 % 9 % 1 % 9 % 6 %
% Hard targets 7 % 1 % 6 % 2 % 0 % 0 % 0 %
2010 (N = 400)
Targets 132 43 61 33 0 24 18
Hard targets 37 8 30 14 0 2 0
No targets 245 324 305 327 367 344 350
Unknown 23 33 34 30 33 32 32
% Targets 33 % 11 % 15 % 8 % 0 % 6 % 5 %
% Hard targets 9 % 2 % 8 % 4 % 0 % 1 % 0 %
2011 (N = 400)
Targets 139 51 78 41 1 39 23
Hard targets 29 7 22 5 0 3 3
No targets 253 344 315 355 391 360 370
Unknown 8 5 7 4 8 1 7
% Targets 35 % 13 % 20 % 10 % 0 % 10 % 6 %
% Hard targets 7 % 2 % 6 % 1 % 0 % 1 % 1 %
20012 (N = 400)
Targets 161 57 86 42 3 33 22
Hard targets 31 6 25 7 0 1 2
No targets 232 340 307 351 392 363 374
Unknown 7 3 7 7 5 4 4
% Targets 40 % 14 % 22 % 11 % 1 % 8 % 6 %
% Hard targets 8 % 2 % 6 % 2 % 0 % 0 % 1 %
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using quantitative, hard targets have significantly reduced
their CSP weaknesses (-0.17, P\ 0.10). In result H3 is
accepted.
Discussion and Conclusions
In response to investors raising financial as well as social
issues, showing their concern for the firms’ economic,
social, and environmental performance firms seek to
improve their CSP.
In this research, we look at the effectiveness of
improving CSP through the use of CSP targets in executive
compensation. Although it has been recognized by many
that using CSP targets might contribute to CSP improve-
ment of firms, there is only one study that actually assesses
the effectiveness of CSP targets (Russo and Harrison
2005). Unfortunately, this research dates from 2005,
focuses on one single aspect of CSP (environment), and
only includes companies in the electronics industry. This
current study aims to provide a contemporary and integral
perspective on the relation between CSP and the use of
CSP targets in executive compensation. This study results
in three important findings that increase our knowledge
about the use of CSP targets.
First, it was expected that especially firms with weaker
CSP would use CSP targets, but the results show no sig-
nificant linkage between CSP and the use of CSP targets in
executive compensation. In other words, firms with weak
CSP results as well as firms with strong CSP results use
CSP targets. This is problematic in light of the importance
of variation in terms of CSR regulation, norms, measures,
pressures, and performance across industries and individual
firms (e.g., Etzion 2007) and weakens our confidence in the
use of explicit remuneration targets. Second, across the
board a positive effect of CSP targets on the improvement
of CSP cannot be detected in this study. However, when
the distinction is made between the types of CSP targets,
we do see that quantitative, hard CSP targets are effective
in improving CSP. This third finding empirically confirms
the expectation raised by Eurosif (2010) that qualitative,
soft CSP targets are generally ineffective.
Based on these findings, we must face the possibility
that the use of CSP targets in executive compensation and
CSP improvement might not be related (or might be only
weakly related) in firms, even when these firms claim an
explicit linkage between these two variables. The notion of
a limited effective relationship is an important one as it
contributes to the ongoing quest whether CSP targets are a
sign of corporate responsibility or just window dressing
(Berrone and Gomez-Mejia 2009a; Kolk and Perego 2014;
Tonello 2011). Research in the management area already
showed that CEO performance-based compensation might
result from a mix of performance-driven and symbolic
forces. Westphal and Zajac (1994) and Zajac and Westphal
(1995) found that a substantial proportion of the largest US
firms were likely to adopt but not actually use (or to use
only in a limited fashion) long-term incentive performance
plans. This finding is consistent with the logic that certain
governance mechanisms are a response to external pres-
sures (Luoma and Goodstein 1999; Kolk and Perego 2014)
instead of an attempt to improve performance. A similar
situation might well prevail in the context of CSP links to
top executive compensation. Faced with pressures for
accountability and legitimacy in a world where CSR issues
are increasingly important, with specific pressures for
compensation linkages from activist shareholders, social
investing funds, and other stakeholders, compensation
committees might respond by explicitly using CSP targets
in executive compensation and rest satisfied with this
initiative.
The results suggest that quantitative, hard targets seem
to be mainly used for managerial purposes leading to
improved CSP results, while qualitative, soft CSP targets
seem to be mainly used for symbolic reasons, not leading
Table 4 Relation between the level of CSP results and the use of
CSP targets in executive compensation
CSP targets
Beta (SE) Beta (SE) Beta (SE)
CSP total(t-1) 0.02
(0.03)
CSP weaknesses(t-1) 0.02
(0.02)
CSP strengths(t-1) 0.02
(0.05)
CSP targets(t-1) -0.14***
(0.03)
-0.21***
(0.03)
-0.18***
(0.03)
CSP committee(t-1) 0.07
(0.05)
-0.02
(0.02)
0.10*
(0.05)
ROA(t-1) 0.00
(0.00)
-0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
LN (total assets) (t-1) -0.00
(0.01)
-0.00
(0.01)
0.00
(0.02)
Constant 0.42
(0.35)
0.17
(0.18)
0.25
(0.38)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1.408 1.422 1.397
R2 0.05 0.06 0.07
OLS regression with full sample, where the dependent variable is the
use of CSP targets
*** P\ 0.01; ** P\ 0.05; * P\ 0.10, based on two-tailed tests,
robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level in parentheses
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to any direct improvement of CSP. This does not imply
however that soft targets have no value at all. Soft targets
can have signaling power, raise awareness, and motivate
people involved. The use of qualitative, soft targets might
be used internally as an instrument to raise awareness and
to motivate executives to exert more attention to CSP. Next
to that, the targets might also be used and made known to
the public to signal to the stakeholders how important CSP
is for the firm. Nevertheless, it might be worthwhile for
firms to make soft targets as clear, controllable, and
objective as possible. In conclusion, the most important
practical implication of this study is that the findings pre-
sent an encouragement for the use of quantitative, hard
CSP targets in executive compensation. Moreover, it pro-
vides evidence for the effectiveness of quantitative, hard
targets to reduce especially CSP weaknesses.
Several limitations apply to this study of which some
could be addressed in future research. Firstly, the sample
only includes large US firms. As such, some caution is
needed in generalizing the findings across all kinds of
firms. Using a more representative sample, future research
could examine whether these conclusions also hold for
smaller firms or firms from other regions. Secondly, the
study relies on the measures developed by MSCI ESG
STATS to assess CSP. It might be questioned whether CSP
results can be captured fully by the MSCI ESG STATS
measures. Next to that, as an archival study we can only
provide evidence on associations, not causality (see, e.g.,
Alewine 2010; Cho et al. 2012). Thirdly, the data on CSP
targets in executive compensation are collected from one
single source, proxy statements. Although cross-checks
were installed to minimize the effects of the human factor
in the data gathering, there is still a possibility that some
unidentified discrepancies remain. Finally, we do not
explore whether the use of CSP targets leads to actual
higher or lower financial CEO remuneration. For future
research to be able to perform more specific analyses of the
effects that CSP targets have on CSP, firms would need to
report the percentages of executive compensation that are
linked to CSP targets and to financial targets. This study
might encourage other researchers to build upon the results
and remaining questions. For example, it might be inter-
esting to investigate the contribution of executive com-
pensation packages to the disparity between executive and
ordinary employee remuneration. While social inequality
has risen in recent years and is becoming a significant
ethical concern. Next to that, historically compensation
packages have been tied to a firm’s financial performance
Table 5 Relation between the
use of CSP targets in executive
compensation and CSP results
CSP total CSP strengths CSP weaknesses
Beta (SE) Beta (SE) Beta (SE) Beta (SE) Beta (SE) Beta (SE)
CSP targets(t-1) -0.01
(0.03)
-0.01
(0.02)
0.00
(0.02)
Hard CSP targets(t-1) 0.11**
(0.06)
0.05
(0.04)
-0.05*
(0.03)
Soft CSP targets(t-1) -0.04
(0.03)
-0.02
(0.02)
0.02
(0.02)
CSP committee(t-1) -0.01
(0.05)
0.00
(0.05)
-0.01
(0.04)
-0.02
(0.04)
-0.01
(0.03)
-0.02
(0.03)
Corresponding CSP score(t-1) 0.29***
(0.03)
0.29***
(0.03)
0.30***
(0.03)
0.31***
(0.03)
0.38***
(0.03)
0.37***
(0.03)
ROA(t-1) 0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.00
(0.00)
-0.00
(0.00)
LN (total assets)(t-1) -0.01
(0.01)
-0.01
(0.01)
-0.01
(0.01)
-0.01
(0.01)
0.00
(0.01)
0.00
(0.01)
Constant 0.34
(0.34)
0.29
(0.34)
0.68**
(0.27)
0.61**
(0.28)
0.29
(0.19)
0.27
(0.20)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1.791 1.846 1.791 1.846 1791 1.846
R2 0.42 0.42 0.31 0.32 0.46 0.46
OLS regressions with time lag with full sample, where the dependent variable is the MSCI ESG STATS
score
*** P\ 0.01; ** P\ 0.05; * P\ 0.10, based on two-tailed tests, robust standard errors, clustered at the
firm level in parentheses
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and frequently resulted in an emphasis on share value or
return on equity. It would be interesting to research whe-
ther CSP components in executive compensation supple-
ment or replace financial incentives.
In practice, many firms use CSP targets without any
academic evidence that CSP targets actually lead to
improved CSP results. This study gives novel insights by
providing empirical evidence of CSP being not such a good
predictor for the use of CSP targets but being a conse-
quence of the use of quantitative, hard CSP targets. Firms
are expected to be able to improve their CSP results using
quantitative, hard CSP targets.
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